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ABSTRACT
Chervenak and McCullough, authors of the most
acknowledged ethical framework for maternal–fetal
surgery, rely on the ‘ethical–obstetrical’ concept of the
fetus as a patient in order to determine what is morally
owed to fetuses by both physicians and the women who
gestate them in the context of prenatal surgery. In this
article, we reconstruct the argumentative structure of
their framework and present an internal criticism. First,
we analyse the justiﬁcatory arguments put forward by
the authors regarding the moral status of the fetus qua
patient. Second, we discuss the internal coherence and
consistency of the moral obligations those authors derive
from that concept. We claim that some of the dilemmas
their approach is purported to avoid, such as the debate
about the independent moral status of the fetus, and
the foundation of the moral obligations of pregnant
women (towards the fetuses they gestate) are not, all
things considered, avoided. Chervenak and McCullough
construct the obligations of physicians as obligations
towards entities with equal moral status. But, at the
same time, they assume that the woman has an
independent moral status while the moral status of the
fetus is dependent on the decision of the woman to
present it to a physician for care. According to the logic
of their own argumentation, Chervenak and McCullough
implicitly admit a different moral status of the woman
and the fetus, which will lead to different ascription of
duties of the physician than those they ascribed.
INTRODUCTION
Maternal–fetal surgery (MFS) can be deﬁned as a
series of prenatal surgical interventions which aim
at correcting or improving the outcome of life-
threatening or severely debilitating fetal congenital
birth defects.
The century-old idea that pregnancy is an instance
of conﬂict and that women and fetuses are potential
antagonists are present throughout the literature on
‘fetal surgery’. That discourse eventually led to the
widespread idea that the fetus is a patient in its own
right, separate or separable from the woman in
whom it gestates.1 2 The ‘fetal patient’ gained its
way into the vocabulary of ‘fetal surgeons’ who use
it to justify the clinical and social value of their dis-
cipline and their own personal moral obligations
towards the fetuses they operate on, almost as if it
were an undisputable or self-evident truth.1 3 4
In order to determine what is morally due to
both fetuses and women in the context of MFS,
Chervenak and McCullough (C&M), authors of
the most acknowledged ethical framework for
MFS, also rely on what they call the ethical–obstet-
rical concept of ‘the fetus as a patient’.5–7
But that the fetus is or can become a patient in
its own right is not self-evident at all. And, if it is
going to be the foundation of the ‘maternal’ and of
the clinicians’ moral obligations towards the fetus,
justiﬁcatory argument must be given. In this paper,
we analyse the arguments put forward by C&M
for the moral status of the fetus qua patient and we
discuss whether the moral obligations those authors
derive from that concept are internally consistent
and coherent.
MORAL STATUS OF THE FETUS QUA PATIENT
To have moral status is roughly to be worth of
moral concern and respect. There are many theor-
ies about how one comes to acquire it, but most
justiﬁcations depend on the possession of a certain
property or quality (being alive, sentient, a member
of a certain species, being a person, a rational
agent, having the potential to acquire or develop
the relevant property, etc). It is just not possible
within the scope of this paper to discuss the justiﬁ-
cation for the ascription of moral status in detail.
Instead, we focus on the issues that arise when we
try to apply a theory, like the one proposed by
C&M, which grounds moral obligation towards
the fetuses on their special social standing of being
patients.
Dependent versus independent moral status
C&M have construed a beneﬁcence-based concept
of being a patient and have extended it to the
debate of the moral status of the fetus.7–9 They dis-
tinguish between two kinds of moral status: that
which is based on an entity’s constitutive property/
ies (independent moral status) and that which is the
result of special social interactions, independently
of one’s constitutive properties (dependent moral
status). Dependent moral status is acquired in
virtue of an entity’s position in relation to others
and in the context of a particular relationship,
namely, the one that is established between a
patient and a physician.
Being a patient is thus to have a moral status of
sorts. An entity becomes a patient and, for this
reason, worth of moral consideration as such when
it is presented to a physician for care and there are
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interventions that are reliably expected, from an evidence-based
clinical point of view, to beneﬁt it.7
On their account, it is the physician’s commitment to ﬁdu-
ciary responsibility towards those presented to his/her care that
is the basis for the ascription of the moral status of ‘patient’.
From this perspective, from the point of view of a physician,
all patients are patients in the same degree, independently of
any other qualifying properties. One does not need, for
example, to be a person in any morally relevant sense of the
word to be a patient. One needs only to be or be placed in a
relationship that generates moral status and the correlative
moral ‘relation-generated’ ﬁduciary obligations. Since there are
no degrees of being a patient, the ﬁduciary beneﬁce-based obli-
gations of physicians towards their patients do not also vary in
degree.7
The moral status of the ‘pregnant and fetal patients’
C&M consider that there are at least two, albeit inseparable,
patient–research subjects in MFS: a woman and at least one
fetus. The moral status of such different but inseparable entities
would differ in that average adult women have full, independent
moral status, and fetuses may have dependent moral status.
Pregnant women have independent moral status because they
generally possess the characteristics or properties (eg, humanity,
reason, personhood) that, according to most ethical theories,
give them a claim to have their legitimate interests protected
and eventually promoted and a right to have one’s legitimate
interests respected by others. In contrast, according to C&M,
fetuses may have dependent moral status because even though
they might lack the features necessary for independent moral
status, their social position in relation to others is such that it
generates moral status and correlative moral relation-generated
obligations to protect that entity’s interests, in this case, its clin-
ical interests.7
The argument of C&M for the moral status of the fetus qua
patient can be summarised in the following captions:
1. When the entity presented for care is a fetus, its being a
patient is the function of: (a) its position in the relation-
ship with a physician, (b) the existence of interventions
that, from a medical point of view, are reliably expected
to beneﬁt it and (c) the existence of a reliable link
between the fetus and its later achieving the moral status
of a child, and then a person.
2. There are two links between the fetus and its later achiev-
ing the moral status of a child, and then a person: (a) the
pregnant woman’s choice to continue a previablei preg-
nancy to term and (b) her choice to present her viable or
previable fetus to care by a physician.
3. When all the previous conditions are present, from the per-
spective of a physician, the previable and viable fetus
becomes worthy of moral consideration qua patient. For a
physician that entails a prima facie beneﬁcence-based obli-
gation to protect its clinical interests. For the woman in
whose body the fetal patient is gestating, fetal patienthood
involves a similar ought. The difference between the moral
obligations of physicians and pregnant women towards the
fetal patient is determined only by viability, and only in
relation to the pregnant women. That is, according to
C&M, pregnant women are under no moral obligation to
present their previable or viable fetuses to care by a phys-
ician, even when there are clinical interventions that might
beneﬁt them, or the children that they will become. When,
however, a woman chooses to present a viableii fetus to
care, this too originates a prima facie beneﬁcence-based
obligation to protect that fetus’ clinical interests that
cannot be waved. That is, according to C&M, both physi-
cians and pregnant women have prima facie beneﬁcence-
based obligations towards the viable fetal patient.
4. In addition, because fetal and pregnant patients are differ-
ent but inseparable patients, and because the moral status
of pregnant women as patients is an independent one,
physicians must in all cases balance prima facie
beneﬁcence-based obligations towards the fetus against
prima facie beneﬁcence- and autonomy-based obligations
towards the woman in whose body the fetus gestates.
Because fetuses are patients only through the autonomous
choice of pregnant women, and since the latter have inde-
pendent moral status, physicians must at all times, but not
unconditionally, respect their autonomous choices.
Referral of C&M to four principles of biomedical ethics of
Beauchamp and Childress: autonomy and beneﬁcence
It is important to point out that the proposal of C&M is to
build up from the perspective of physicians who take care of
pregnant patients and specialise in interventions that aim at
beneﬁting the fetus. In order to determine what is morally due
to the fetal patient by those in charge of its care in the context
of MFS, they refer to both John Gregory‘s work and the well
known ‘four principle’ approach to biomedical ethics developed
by Beauchamp and Childress.7 8 11 As guidance for practical
moral decision-making, this approach puts forward the princi-
ples of respect for autonomy, of beneﬁcence, of non-maleﬁcence
and of justice.
Beauchamp and Childress do not offer a comprehensive
ethical theory but a kind of approach that should guide
decision-making in a process of weighing and specifying the
four principles. The status they ascribe to the four principles
has changed over the last decades in the various versions of
their book since its ﬁrst publication in 1979. According to
their current view, Beauchamp and Childress see the four prin-
ciples as an expression of a so-called shared or universal
common morality which contains all principles and only those
principles that all morally serious persons accept as authorita-
tive.12 The principles are grounded in common morality in the
sense that they are grounded in a sort of pretheoretical moral
point of view to which everyone has access, that is not equiva-
lent to any particular ethical theory and that transcends local
costumes and attitudes. For this reason, the four principles are
not in a hierarchical position in relation to a higher ethical
principle, like the greatest happiness principle in Utilitarianism
or the categorical imperative for Kantians, and they are also
not in a hierarchical position in relation to each other as action
guiding norms. As Beauchamp and Childress, C&M also
sustain the prima facie character of moral principles. That
means that each principle is binding unless it conﬂicts with
another, which, according to the circumstances of the case at
iThe biological, medical and legal concept of fetal viability consists of
the expected capacity of the fetus to survive birth, even if for that
substantial technological support is needed. In most developed
countries, a fetus is said to acquire this ability at 24 weeks of gestation.10
iiA pregnant woman can confer and withdraw the moral status of patient
to her fetuses at any time during previability, because there are no
medical interventions that are reliably expected to beneﬁt her fetus were
it to be born before the gestational age of viability.
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hand, is also pertinent. When the latter leads to an irreconcil-
able conﬂict of obligation, a solution that is compatible with
the clashing principles must be found.iii
If this is the background against which the ethical framework
of C&M for MFS research should be understood, then there
are several points that deserve further consideration.
Beneﬁcence versus autonomy in MFS
First, there is the question of whether moral status, understood
as being worth of moral consideration, is something that can be
derived from an entity’s position in a social relationship, like
the one that is established between physicians and patients. In a
reply to Carson Strong,14 C&M sustained that their theory
about dependent moral status applies exclusively to a special
group of entities, that is, human patients.15 By the same token,
the moral obligations that derive from the moral status of
fetuses as patients would be binding only to those who are
morally engaged with them within a ﬁduciary relationship of
medical care, and not extensive to all others who are worth of
moral consideration on different grounds. One may also wonder
why only human fetuses should have this dependent moral
status, and not other entities. C&M do not offer a strong argu-
ment for this.
In addition, even if we assume that C&M provide a sufﬁcient
justiﬁcation for the moral obligations of fetal surgeons towards
the fetal patient, they do not provide sufﬁcient justiﬁcation of
the moral obligations of pregnant women towards their fetuses
in the context of MFS.
‘A pregnant woman is obligated to take only reasonable risks
of obstetric interventions that are reliably expected to beneﬁt
the viable fetus or child later’.16 iv
However, because the connection between a woman and her
fetus can hardly be described as a physician–patient relationship,
the prima facie beneﬁcence obligations C&M claim pregnant
women have towards their fetuses must rely somewhere else. An
account of the foundations of the moral obligations of pregnant
women towards their fetuses is therefore missing.
Second, according to C&M, contrary to claims of independ-
ent moral status, ‘the physician’s commitment to ﬁduciary
responsibility for the fetal and pregnant patient is a certain and
therefore a highly reliable basis for the moral status of both
patients’.15 In practice, what this means is that in the context of
MFS there are two patients (albeit inseparable) to whom physi-
cians owe role-speciﬁc beneﬁcence-based obligations. Since,
according to C&M, from a fetal surgeon’s perspective, there are
also no degrees of being a patient, their duty to provide
assistance and care to women and fetuses is not dependent on
any other consideration, apart from their being patients.
In this sense, C&M defend an ‘egalitarian’ position in rela-
tion to the moral status of patients that produces beneﬁcence
role-speciﬁc obligations. In other words, as equals (in their role
as patients) pregnant women and fetuses have an equal claim to
receive available medical care that is reliably expected to medic-
ally beneﬁt them. As a result, when a physician’s duty of care to
the pregnant women conﬂict with the duty of care he/or she
owes to fetuses, a solution must be found that does not com-
promise the care of either those patients: a compromise that
would consist on a violation of the role-speciﬁc moral obliga-
tions of physicians.
Third, that pregnant women carrying fetal patients are also
fetal surgeons’ patients in the same degree as fetuses is not self-
evident, however. As previously mentioned, MFS is typically
deﬁned as a series of interventions that aim at beneﬁting the
fetus and eventually the child and person it will become, by cor-
recting or improving the outcome of congenital birth defects. If
this is correct, one could indeed ask, who exactly the patient in
MFS is. If an entity acquires the moral status of patient when it
is presented to a physician for care and there exists interventions
that are reliably expected to beneﬁt it, then fetal surgery is not
an intervention that can beneﬁt directly the pregnant woman.
Only if we take the effects of the fetal surgery on the psycho-
social beneﬁts for the pregnant woman into account this would
make some sense, but that seems not to be the primary aim of
the surgeons’ interventions.
One of us has argued elsewhere that in the context of clinical
research involving MFS, namely in the context of clinical trials
comparing experimental fetal intervention with expectant man-
agement during pregnancy, pregnant women can be seen as
volunteers of sorts, precisely because, for them personally, pre-
natal surgery has no prospect of direct beneﬁt.17 These consid-
erations were made in a different context but an analogy can be
made here.
Credit must be given to C&M in this respect. They have actu-
ally claimed that because fetal patients are different but not sep-
arable from pregnant women, physicians must in all cases
balance prima facie beneﬁcence-based obligations towards the
fetus against prima facie beneﬁcence- and autonomy-based obli-
gations towards the woman in whose body the fetus is gestating.
Respect for the autonomy of a pregnant woman, translated into
her choice of presenting a previable or viable fetus for care, is
justiﬁed by appeal to the latter’s possession of independent
moral status qua person and rights bearer.
What this means is that, in her relationship with fetal sur-
geons, the pregnant woman is a ‘different’ kind of patient than
the fetus. Even though she has no prospect of direct clinical
beneﬁt from the fetal intervention, she has, apart from beneﬁ-
cence role-related claims, a claim (if not even a right) to have
her autonomy respected by fetal surgeons. In other words, con-
trary to the fetus which has only beneﬁcence-based interests that
must be protected and fostered, pregnant women have add-
itional morally justiﬁed claims in relation to fetal surgeons. The
latter might entail that pregnant women and fetuses do not
possess moral status as patients in the same degree, not even
from a physician’s perspective. If a pregnant woman is free, in
virtue of her autonomy, to give and withdraw her moral status
as patient, as well as the moral status of her previable fetus,
then, in relation to that fetus and in the context of the inter-
action with healthcare professionals, she assumes a privileged
and superior status. In fact, her position is so privileged that the
whole issue of fetal patienthood is dependent on her presenting
iiiIn order to determine which principle/s should guide our actions in a
particular context, the content of the four principles must be speciﬁed
and justiﬁed in accordance with the circumstances of the case at hand.
When the case at hand falls under the ‘jurisdiction’ of two or more
principles, and when the application of both leads to an irreconcilable
conﬂict of obligation, Beauchamp and Childress propose the use of the
‘Rawlsian’13 inspired method of wide reﬂective equilibrium. Roughly,
according to this method, the strengths and weaknesses of all plausible
moral beliefs, moral judgments, principles, and moral theories are
evaluated with the aim of ﬁnding a plausible and coherent solution to
that conﬂict. A coherent solution to a conﬂict is the one that is most
compatible with our most basic ‘considered judgments’, that is, with
those beliefs and norms that all morally serious persons accept as
authoritative and that translate into the four principles of biomedical
ethics.
ivWe are aware of the controversial nature of this claim.15 However, as
mentioned previously in this article, we will proceed without
questioning it.
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her fetus to a physician for care and, on her consenting, on a
second moment to surgery for fetal beneﬁt.
Conﬂict of obligation
A conﬂict of obligation for fetal surgeons will arise when on a
ﬁrst moment a pregnant woman confers the moral status as
patient to her viable fetus by presenting herself and her fetus
for medical care, and then, on a second moment, withdraws
that status by refusing to submit herself (with her fetus) to
surgery.
In these cases, according to C&M, the physician is not
excused from his beneﬁcence role-related moral obligations
towards the viable fetal patient, which are now in open conﬂict
with the role-related autonomy obligations towards the woman.
How could these conﬂicts be solved? C&M tell us that these
obligations must be balanced, but they do not provide a criter-
ion according to which obedience to one moral obligation can
override and justiﬁably take precedence over another in a
conﬂict.
We can foresee two options:
▸ either the autonomy of the pregnant patient is respected,
overriding the beneﬁcence-based and role-speciﬁc moral obli-
gations of fetal surgeons towards the fetus or
▸ the beneﬁcence, role-speciﬁc moral obligations of fetal sur-
geons towards the viable fetus override the respect for auton-
omy due to the pregnant patient.
In view of the fact that there is no hierarchical relationship
between the principle of respect for autonomy and the principle
of beneﬁcence as proposed by Beauchamp and Childress, and
on which C&M apparently rely, a morally justiﬁed choice must
be made in favour of one of those principles. How can such a
choice be made in a morally justiﬁed fashion, that is, in a way
that does not compromise fetal surgeons’ role-related moral
obligations, is something C&M do not say.
In the context of MFS, if a choice is made in favour of the
respect for the autonomy of pregnant patients, as we suspect it
would be the case, we cannot foresee a justiﬁcatory argument
that ignores the independent moral status of that type of patient
as a person and eventually a bearer of human rights. After all,
that status is conferred to ‘normal’ average adult pregnant
women by all comprehensive moral theories, not to mention
also the law. If that is the case, there is no conﬂict between obli-
gations towards two patients that would have an egalitarian
moral status without degrees. C&M are constructing a conﬂict
that they cannot even develop consistently within their own
framework. Although they claim that their approach to the
‘ethics’ of MFS differs signiﬁcantly from those that rely on
claims for or against the independent moral status of the fetus,
in that it does not introduce the ‘paralyzing and intractable’v
debates about sentience, personhood and human rights, we
believe their approach cannot avoid making some tacit
assumptions from those debates. A patient which is also a
person and a rights bearer cannot be addressed by a physician in
the same way a fetal patient is, especially when, in order to
comply with one’s moral obligation towards the fetus, one must
intervene, physically, on another patient to whom we owe
respect as a patient and as a person and a rights bearer outside
the context of a hospital.
When a conﬂict of duty arises in the context of MFS, fetal
surgeons cannot thus appeal exclusively to their role-related
moral obligations.vi The dilemmas the approach of C&M is pur-
ported to avoid, such as the debate about the independent
moral status of fetuses, are not avoided at all, since that issue
will come back to the table whenever there is a conﬂict of duty
involving the respect for the autonomy of pregnant women and
the beneﬁcence-based obligations physicians have towards viable
fetuses in MFS.
CONCLUSIONS
Our aim was to uncover some of the limitations of the approach
of C&M to the ethics of MFS. Although the topic deserves
further thought, it was not our aim to discuss whether moral
status is something we can derive from the position one assumes
in the context of special social relationships, like the one that is
established between a patient and his or her physician.
What we did was to check the coherence and consistency of
the proposal of C&M with their own foundational assumptions,
including their justiﬁcation of the concept of the fetus as a
patient and of the nature of fetal surgeons’ obligations towards
pregnant and fetal patients. We recognise that we have been
very critical of the position of C&M, but offered no alternative
in return. We are working on such an alternative. The later will
not avoid the debate about the moral status of the fetus; a
debate that will always be, inevitably, in the background of any
attempt to morally justify what is owned to pregnant women
and fetuses by those who are in charge of their medical care.
The justiﬁcation of the moral obligations pregnant women have
towards their fetuses in the context of care is also inescapable
and cannot be made on the same terms of the justiﬁcation of
physician’s moral obligations, since the relationship that is estab-
lished between woman and fetus cannot be deﬁned in terms of
medical care.
One can even imagine that there is no relationship at all
between pregnant women and fetuses, for it can be sustained
that the latter are entities that cannot engage in moral interac-
tions. For now, it is however enough to say that the debate
about the moral obligations of physicians towards the fetus
cannot be transposed to the debate about the moral status of
pregnant women and fetuses.
Contributors HCMLR: writing of the manuscript. PPvdB: critical review of the
manuscript. MD: writing and critical review of the manuscript. Each author has
participated actively and sufﬁciently in the preparation of the manuscript and take
full responsibility for its content. All authors have read and approved its submission.
Competing interests None.
Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed.
v‘The principle advantage of for research ethics of the ethical concept of
the fetus as a patient (…) is that the ethics of research on pregnant
women is conceptually independent of the discourses of personhood,
fetal rights, and the unborn child. The unnecessary and unwarranted
introduction of such discourses will only polarize and therefore paralyze
research ethics and therefore paralyze clinical research on pregnant
women because the application of these discourses will result in
philosophically irresolvable competition among sharply differing
candidates for an acceptable risk-beneﬁt ratio. The abortion debate will
simply replicate itself in the ethics of research on pregnant women with
the same paralyzing consequences that it has had for the ethics of
abortion.’7
viNote that we have repeatedly referred to fetal surgeons’ moral
obligations. We do not mean that only fetal surgeons have moral
obligations towards fetal and pregnant patients in MFS. When we say
‘fetal surgeons’, we mean also all those who are involved in the care of
pregnant patients for fetal beneﬁt.
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